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BALDRIGE/MURAZUMI AGREEMENT: THE 
SUPREME COURT GIVES CREDENCE TO AN 
ABERRATION IN AMERICAN CETACEAN SOCIETY 
III 
James Michael Zimmerman* 
The Japanese do not regard the whale as a valuable pet, totally dif-
ferent from other marine living resources, and they thus feel that such 
regulations are unjustified as they have practiced whaling for many 
years without any reasonable scientific complaint. 1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
(ICRW), which provides for the establishment of the International 
* B.A., 1982, University of California, Irvine; M.B.A., 1984, University of California, 
Irvine; J.D., 1987, University of San Diego. The author is presently the Lead Articles Editorl 
Law of the Sea Issue Coordinator for the San Diego Law Review. The author thanks Eugene 
and Joanne Zimmerman for their valuable comments, support, and enthusiasm throughout 
the writing of this article. 
1 Sugiyama, Japanese View Toward the Law of the Sea and Whaling, in THE WHALING 
ISSUE IN UNITED STATEs--JAPAN RELATIONS 224 (1976). Many Japanese commentators 
refute the environmentalist point of view. One such writer contends: 
Supporters of the campaign for an overall ban on whaling and some countries, 
including Japan, in favor of continuing whaling operations appear to be taking basi-
cally different stands regarding the concept about the character of the whale as an 
animal. It seems that the former holds the view that whales should be classified in 
the same category of wild animals as lions, elephants and giraffes. In contrast, the 
latter feels that whales are a source of esculent animals. 
Food supplies cannot be increased sufficiently, swiftly and sharply to keep pace with 
rising population. Food supplies from lands are limited. Hence, animal protein re-
sources required by man should be sought from seas for coping with the situation. If 
management of marine resources is adequately and scientifically carried out, oceans 
can be properly pastured in the same manner as raising cattle and swine on land. 
Marine resources at the same time are not in the stage of extermination. 
Morisawa, International Opinion on Whaling and Japan's Position, 31 Keidanren Rev. 7-12 
(1974). 257 
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Whaling Commission (IWC), was created shortly after World War 
11.2 The original purpose of the Convention was to strengthen the 
whaling industry via a cartel to stabilize whale oil prices and other 
regulations benefitting the industry. 3 In time, the IWC became a 
vehicle for the conservation, and ultimately, the preservation of 
marine mammals. The IWC's philosophy thus shifted from regulating 
the efficient use of marine resources to protecting completely marine 
mammals based on ecological, aesthetic, and ethical considerations. 4 
Congress recognized the importance of preserving whales through 
the instrumentality of the Convention. In addition to authorizing 
U.S. participation in the Convention,5 both the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate passed resolutions calling for an international 
2 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, openedfor signature Dec. 2, 1946, 
62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 361 [hereinafter ICRW]. Article III, section 
1 of the ICRW provides for the establishment of the International Whaling Commission (lWC 
or Commission). Article IV of the Convention requires the IWC to: 
(a) encourage, recommend, or if necessary, organize studies and investigations relat-
ing to whales and whaling; 
(b) collect and analyze statistical information concerning the current condition and 
trend of the whale stocks and the effects of whaling activities thereon; 
(c) study, appraise, and disseminate information concerning methods of maintaining 
and increasing the popUlations of whale stocks. 
I d. at 1718, art. IV. Article V holds the Commission responsible for amending the Convention's 
whaling schedule to meet changing circumstances. Id. art. v. 
3 For a comprehensive discussion of the 1946 Convention and its early practices, see 1 P. 
BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING 205-60 (1985). See also R. BURTON, THE 
LIFE AND DEATH OF WHALES (1980); Smith, The International Whaling Commission: An 
Analysis of the Past and Reflections on the Future, 16 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 543 (1984). 
Up until the early 1970's, the IWC covertly supported the whaling industry. In June of 1972, 
several countries attending the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 
adopted a resolution demanding improved regulation of whale resources. Supported by 110 
nations, the resolution called for international cooperation in strengthening the IWC. REPORT 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (Stockholm), AlConf. 
48/141Rev.1 at 12 (June 5-16, 1972) (Recommendation No. 33), see also INT'L WHALING 
COMM'N, 24th Report 23-24 (1974). 
4 For a discussion of moral and aesthetic justifications for cetacean protection, see Travalio 
& Clement, International Protection of Marine Mammals, 5 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 199,205-
07 (1979). See generally Levin, Toward Effective Cetacean Protection, 12 NAT. RESOURCES 
LAW. 549 (1979); Scarff, The International Management of Whales, Dolphins and Porpoises: 
An Interdisciplinary Assessment (Part One), 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 323 (1977) [hereinafter Scarff 
I]; Scarff, The International Management of Whales, Dolphins and Porpoises: An Interdis-
ciplinary Assessment (Part Two), 6 Ecology L. Q. 571 (1977) [hereinafter Scarff II]. For an 
analysis of the political and economic problems of the IWC, see M'Gonigle, The "Economizing" 
of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 119 (1980); see also Kindt & 
Wintheiser, The Conservation and Protection of Marine Mammals, 7 U. HAWAII L. REV. 
301 (1985). 
6 Whaling Convention Act of 1949, 64 Stat. 421 (1950)(codified as amended at), 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 916e-9161 (1982). 
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whaling moratorium. 6 Congress also adopted the 1971 Pelly Amend-
ment to the Fishermen's Protective AcF (Pelly Amendment) and the 
1979 Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act8 (Packwood-Magnuson Amendment) to pro-
mote enforcement of quotas set by the IWC. The statutes are pu-
nitive measures to be applied to any nation that "diminishes the 
effectiveness" of any international conservation program. The Pelly 
Amendment allows the federal government to ban fish and fish prod-
uct imports from any offending nation, and the Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendment calls for the reduction of the offending nation's fisheries 
allocation in the United States fishery conservation zone by at least 
fifty percent. The Secretary of Commerce's certification of the of-
fending nation triggers both the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendments. Under the Pelly Amendment, the President has the 
discretion to impose sanctions on the certified nation. In contrast, 
under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, once a nation is certi-
fied, sanctions are automatically imposed. 
In 1981, the IWC ordered a zero quota for harvesting North Pacific 
sperm whales. 9 In 1982, the Commission voted to implement a mor-
atorium on all commercial whaling by 1986. 10 Japan, exercising its 
rights under the Convention, objected to both IWC decisions. During 
the 1982-83 and 1983-84 whaling seasons, Japan continued to hunt 
for sperm whales contravening the IWC ban. 11 
With the 1984-85 whaling season in progress, and with the unli-
kelihood that Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige would act 
expeditiously against Japan, several environmental organizations 
6 S.J. Res. 115, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONGo REC. 22668 (1971); H. Con. Res. 387, 92d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 117 Congo Rec. 38537 (1971). The federal government still permits the Arctic 
Eskimos to hunt bowhead whales. For an analysis of this situation, see Verges & McClendon, 
Innuit Eskimos, Bowhead Whales, and Oil: Competing Federal Interests in the BeaUfort Sea, 
10 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1980); Bockstoce, Battle of the Bowheads, NAT. HIS., May 
1980, at 52; Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 4, at 336-39. 
7 Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971) (codified at 22 U.S.C. 1978 (1982)). See infra notes 
74-85 and accompanying text. 
S Pub. L. No. 96-61, 93 Stat. 407 (1979) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1982)). See infra 
notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
9 Review of the 33rd Int'l Whaling Comm'n Meeting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981) [hereinafter Review of the 33rd Int'l Whaling Comm'n Meeting]. 
10 Review of the 34th Int'l Whaling Comm'n Meeting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Human Rights and Int'l Org's of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 
17-19 (1982) [hereinafter Review of the 34th Int'l Whaling Comm'n Meeting]. 
11 See Japan Whaling Assoc. V. American Cetacean Soc'y, Brief for the Respondents 10, _ 
U.S. _, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) [hereinafter Brief for the Respondents]. 
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filed suit in federal district court on November 8, 1984. 12 The plain-
tiffs sought an injunction prohibiting the Secretary from agreeing 
not to certify Japan for harvesting whales in violation of the IWC's 
zero quota. 13 In spite of the pending action, the Secretary on N 0-
vember 13, 1984, made an executive agreement with Japan whereby 
Japan pledged to cease all commercial whaling by 1988, and the 
Secretary agreed that the United States would not certify Japan 
under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments if Japan com-
plied with its pledge. 14 
In the subsequent federal action, the district court held that the 
Secretary's duty to certify foreign nations that "diminish the effec-
tiveness" of conservation programs was a mandatory, not a discre-
tionary, duty.15 The United States Court of Appeals for the District 
12 American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C. 1985) [hereinafter 
American Cetacean Society I]. The original plaintiffs were the American Cetacean Society, 
Animal Protection Institute of American, Animal Welfare Institute, Center for Environmental 
Education, The Fund for Animals, Greenpeace U.S.A., The Humane Society of the United 
States, International Fund for Animal Welfare, The Whale Center, and Thomas Garrett. On 
December 13, 1984, the Connecticut Cetacean Society, Defenders of Wildlife, and Friends of 
the Earth joined the plaintiffs in this suit. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 2, American 
Cetacean Society I. 
The complaint named Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and Secretary of State 
George Schultz, both being sued in their official capacities, because of the crucial role each 
plays in the legislative scheme. The Japanese Whaling Association and Japanese Fisheries 
Association were allowed to intervene as defendants in this action. 
13 American Cetacean Society I, 604 F. Supp. at 1401. 
14 Discussions between Japan and the United States were conducted in Washington, D.C., 
November 1-12, 1984. An exchange of letters followed these negotiations. See Letter from 
Malcolm Baldrige, United States Secretary of Commerce, to Yasushi Murazumi, Charge 
d'Affaires ad interium of Japan (Nov. 13, 1984), reprinted in Appendix to Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit at 
107a, Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, -U.S. _, 106 S.Ct. 2860 (1986) 
[hereinafter Cert. Appendix]; Letter from Yoshio Okawara, Ambassador to Japan, to Malcolm 
Baldrige, United States Secretary of Commerce (Dec. 11, 1984), reprinted in Cert. Appendix 
at 110a; Letter from Malcolm Baldrige, United States Secretary of Commerce, to Yoshio 
Okawara, Ambassador of Japan (Dec. 11, 1984), reprinted in Cert. Appendix at IlIa. The 
executive agreement permits the Japanese to take 400 sperm whales per year for the 1984 
and 1985 hunting seasons, and 200 sperm whales per year for the 1986 and 1987 seasons. 
Japan was also required to withdraw its objections to the IWC's moratorium. For a discussion 
in support of this executive agreement, see Note, The U.S. -- Japanese Whaling Accord: A 
Result of the Discretionary Loophole in the Packwood-Magnuson Agreement, 19 GEO. WASH. 
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 577 (1985); Note, United States Enforcement of World Whaling Pro-
grams-The Pelly and Packwood -Magnuson Amendments, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 2 (1986); see 
also Comment, American Cetacean Society v. Baldrige: Executive Agreements and the Con-
stitutional Limits of Executive Branch Discretion in American Foreign Policy, 12 BROOKLYN 
J. INT'L L. 209 (1986); Note, American Cetacean Society v. Baldrige: A Blow'is Dealt to 
Executive Agreements, 8 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 327 (1986). 
15 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1410 (D.D.C. 1985). 
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of Columbia upheld the lower court's ruling. 16 On June 30, 1986, the 
United States Supreme Court decided Japan Whaling Association 
v. American Cetacean Society17 in a 5-4 decision. 1s The Court re-
versed the lower court's decision and held that the Secretary of 
Commerce has broad discretion to determine whether specific whal-
ing activities meet the "diminish the effectiveness" standard of the 
federal statutory scheme. 
The Supreme Court's decision suffers from a serious flaw. The 
majority, devoting much of its opinion to statutory interpretation, 
overlooked several critical factors and accepted the federal govern-
ment's manipulative interpretation of congressional intent. 19 This 
Article challenges the wisdom of the Supreme Court's decision. It 
first discusses the development of the international regulation of 
whaling and United States participation in such efforts. Second, this 
Article critiques the Court's reasoning in the American Cetacean 
Society Case and its treatment of the Baldrige/Murazumi Agree-
ment. Finally, this Article addresses the implications of the decision 
and suggests that Congress use its corrective power to counter the 
Court's backpeddling. 
II. WHALING AND THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
WHALING 
A. Early Growth of Whaling 
Before mankind developed the capabilities to capture the whale, 
the leviathan was an animal viewed with awe and fear and revered 
as a subject of fables and fantasies.20 Today, mankind views whales 
with the same awe as in bygone epochs, and recognizes them for 
their aesthetic and recreational value. Whale watching, for example, 
has become a world-wide million dollar business. 21 
16 American Cetacean Society v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Amer-
ican Cetacean Society II]. 
17 Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Soc'y, -U.S. _,106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) 
[hereinafter American Cetacean Society Ill]. 
18 The voting distribution in the Court's ruling surprised outside observers. The majority 
opinion was written by Justice White, who was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices 
Powell, Stevens, and O'Conner. The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Marshall. He 
was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Rehnquist. 
19 See American Cetacean Society III, 106 S. Ct. at 2867-68. 
00 See 1 P. BIRNIE, supra note 3, at 63; I. SANDERSON, FOLLOW THE WHALE (1956). The 
whale inspired many biblical writers. See Job 41:1--M; Psalms 104:24-26; Isaiah 27:1. 
21 Maron, Warning! They Break for Whales, San Diego Union, Nov. 23, 1986, at G-4, col. 
1. In reference to the United States Pacific coast whale-watching business, Maron comments: 
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The whale originally was hunted for its oil for heat and light, its 
meat for human consumption, and its ivory teeth to make buttons, 
flageolets, and scrimshaw.22 As technology increased, new uses for 
whale products developed. Whale oil, replaced by petroleum for 
heating and lighting purposes, is now used as a high-grade industrial 
lubricant.23 Whale meat, only rarely used for human consumption, 
is now used in the preparation of pet food and agricultural feed. 
The Basques in Europe during the fourteenth century were prob-
ably the first to hunt whales for commercial purposes.24 Though their 
early hunts were limited to small groups of boats on the Bay of 
Biscay, the Basques soon were voyaging great distances in search 
of their prey.25 This was the beginning of pelagic whaling, the catch-
ing and processing of whales on the high seas.26 The Basques, how-
ever, virtually ceased whaling by" the end of the sixteenth century 
because of over-exploitation. 
In the meantime, several European countries, the United States, 
and Japan entered the whaling industry.27 New advancements in 
shipbuilding technology and navigation increased the accessibility of 
whaling fleets to distant prolific hunting grounds such as Antarctica, 
Tasmania, and the Bering Sea. At its climax in the mid-1800's, the 
American whaling industry employed 70,000 people, and 729 whallng 
vessels sailed under the United States flag.28 This period was also 
marked by the invention of harpoon guns and steam powered 
"catcher" boats.29 Such ballistic technology and swift vessels enabled 
whalers to catch certain species of whales too quick for prior tech-
niques. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, several 
Last year more than a quarter-million whale-watchers spent about $2.75 million for 
cruise tickets, making whale-watching a more profitable business than the earlier 
whaling industry, which almost wiped out gray whales in the first half of this century. 
For a discussion of cetacean intelligence, see Bunnel, The Evolution of Cetacean Intelligence, 
in MIND IN THE WATERS 52 (J. McIntyre, ed. 1974); Morgane, The Whale Brain: The 
Anatomical Basis of Intelligence, in MIND IN THE WATERS 84 (J. McIntyre ed. 1974). 
22 See 1 P. BIRNIE, supra note 3, at 48-61. See also JAPAN WHALING ASS'N, TRADITIONS 
OF DIET: THE WHALE AND THE JAPANESE; JAPAN WHALING ASS'N, IN DEFENSE OF WHAL-
ING: THE JAPANESE SPEAK OUT; JAPAN WHALING ASS'N, MAN, WHALES & THE SEA (avail-
able at the Embassy of Japan, 2520 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008). 
23 1 P. BIRNIE, supra note 3, at 51-52. 
24 For a detailed history of whaling, see J. TONNESSEN & A. JOHNSEN, THE HISTORY OF 
MODERN WHALING (1982). See also Scarff I, supra note 4, at 344; Levin, supra note 4, at 
558; 1 P. BIRNIE, supra note 3, at 63-104. 
25 Levin, supra note 4, at 559; Scarff I, supra note 4, at 344. 
26 1 P. BIRNIE, supra note 3, at 66. 
'l:I Id. at 68-74. 
2B Scarff I, supra note 4, at 345. 
29 Id. at 346. 
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nations ceased their whaling operations. The profitability of their 
industry, like the Basques' in earlier years, failed with over-exploi-
tation. The whaling industry, on the brink of self-destruction, col-
lapsed because many species were believed to be biologically ex-
tinct. 30 
B. Development of International Regulatory Measures 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the whaling industry 
had several sporadic yet lucrative hunting seasons. During the years 
1914-15, 1920-31, and 1938-39, the whaling industry prospered dra-
matically, expanding their fleets with larger and more efficient ves-
sels.31 Though negatively affected by two world wars, the industry 
again nearly collapsed because of the scarcity of several species of 
whales. 32 The stocks of certain species simply could not recover from 
exploitive whaling. The industry itself finally realized that the only 
way to maintain their businesses was to accept some form of regu-
lation. 
The signing of the League of Nations Convention for the Regu-
lation of Whaling signed on September 24, 1931 was the first positive 
step towards conserving whale stocks. 33 The 1931 Convention, how-
ever, focused only on certain species of whales, and made no attempt 
to establish other more coercive regulatory measures such as shorter 
hunting seasons and limits on the number of whaling vessels per 
country.34 More importantly, several leading whaling nations includ-
ing Japan, Germany, Chile, Argentina, and the Soviet Union did not 
sign the 1931 Convention. 
On November 20, 1946, several nations met in Washington, D.C. 
for the purpose of devising a comprehensive regulatory scheme for 
30 Several species of marine mammals, including Stellar's sea cow and the sea mink, are 
known to have become extinct because of human activities. See Travalio & Clement, supra 
note 4, at 199 n.1; Herrington & Regenstein, The Plight of Ocean Mammals, 1 ENVT'L AFF. 
792 (1972). The California gray whale was considered biologically extinct in 1890, but has 
remarkably recovered. The success for the gray whale's rejuvenation is due to the fact that, 
unlike other large cetaceans, it breeds in coastal lagoons and does not face the problem of 
finding a mate in the high seas. See Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 4, at 325. 
" 1 P. BIRNIE, supra note 3, at 74-75. 
32 1 P. BIRNIE, supra note 3, at 130. See also, K. BRANDT, WHALING AND WHALE OIL 
DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR II (1948) . 
.. CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION OF WHALING, Sept. 24, 1931,49 Stat. 3079, T.I.A.S. 
No. 880, 155 U.N.T.S. 349. The convention and the history leading up to the convention is 
discussed in Jessup, The Interrw,tional Protection of Whales, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 751 (1930); 
and in Leonard, Recent Negotiations Toward the Interrw,tional Regulation of Whaling, 35 
AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (1941); see al~o 1 P. B;:RNIE, supra note 3, at 116-118. 
34 1 P. BIRNIE, supra note 3, at 117. 
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the whaling industry.35 The post-war spirit of international cooper-
ation provided the perfect opportunity for such an effort. The dele-
gates accepted a proposal presented by the United States, signing 
what now is known as the International Convention for the Regu-
lation of Whaling (ICRW).36 
The ICRW was created to provide a vehicle for promoting the 
whaling industry by establishing yearly limits or quotas for the 
whaling of various species. As noted in the Preamble of the Conven-
tion, the treaty was founded "to provide for the proper conservation 
of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of 
the whaling industry."37 The ICRW since 1972, however, has steadily 
evolved into a treaty promoting the preservation rather than com-
mercialization of whales. This shift in orientation has resulted in 
serious conflict between conservationists and whaling nations. 38 
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) is the agency au-
thorized to carry out the goals and policies of the Convention. The 
IWC is composed of one commissioner from each contracting gov-
ernment and accompanying experts and advisors.39 The IWC, at its 
annual and/or special meetings, reviews scientific data and sets 
global whaling quotas and regulations restricting whaling methods.40 
The whaling quotas are binding on IWC members if accepted by a 
three-fourths majority vote. 41 The IWC regulates "factory ships, 
land stations, and whale catchers under the jurisdiction of the Con-
35 See ICRW, supra note 2. The founding members of the ICRW were: Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the 
Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. Currently, over 40 nations have ratified the ICRW and have become members 
of the IWC. See 1985 Treaties in Force 311. 
36 See ICRW, supra note 2. 
37 Id. 
38 The whaling nations and conservationists share a common goal of preserving whales from 
extinction. In the past, several attempts have been made to change the IWC and its policies. 
See Carlson, The Interrw,tional Regulation of Small Cetaceans, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 577, 
616 (1984). For example, in 1981, 26 IWC member nations attended a preparatory meeting to 
consider altering IWC policies to improve the effectiveness of its management procedures. 
See REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING TO IMPROVE AND UPDATE THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION OF WHALING, 1946 (Reykjavik, May 1981), IWC/33/20 
(1981). For a discussion of this meeting and its agenda, see 1 P. BIRNIE, supra note 3, at 568-
73. 
39 ICRW, supra note 2, at 1717, art. III, para. 1. 
40 The IWC has three advisory committees including: (1) the Scientific Committee, which 
reviews catch data and depletion rates; (2) the Technical Committee, which drafts amendments 
and reviews alleged infractions; and (3) the Finance and Administrative Committee, which 
manages personnel, budgets, and expenditures. For a general discussion of the IWC, see 
Smith, supra note 3, at 548. 
41 ICRW, supra note 2, at 1717, art. III, para. 2. 
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tracting Governments" and "all waters in which whaling is prose-
cuted by such factory ships, land stations, and whale catchers."42 
The Commission is also authorized to publish reports, statistics, 
scientific data, and other whale and whaling information. 43 
In 1981 the IWC voted to amend its quota tables, reducing the 
annual harvest quota for the Western Division Stock of North Pacific 
sperm whales from 890 adult males to zero adult males. 44 The Com-
mission's vote was 25 to 1, with Japan casting the lone opposition 
vote.45 The People's Republic of China, Iceland, and the Soviet Union 
abstained from voting. 46 The IWC also voted to provide that no 
sperm whales could be taken from the North Pacific stock in any 
future year unless the IWC acted to establish a quota for that year. 47 
Japan, soon thereafter, filed its 'formal objection to the amendment.48 
At the thirty-fourth International Whaling Commission meeting 
in July 1982, the IWC voted to impose a moratorium on all commer-
cial whaling commencing in 1986.49 As a major concession to accom-
modate the whaling interests, the moratorium plan called for a three-
year "deferred cessation" period from 1982 to 1985.50 The morato-
rium, to be effective from 1985 to 1990, would allow depleted whale 
stocks to regenerate and would permit scientists to have an oppor-
42 Id. at 1717, art. I, para. 2. 
43 Id. at 1718, art. IV, para. 2 . 
.. Supra note 9. See Birnie, The Role of Developing Countries in Nudging the International 
Whaling Commission from Regulating Whaling to Encouraging Nonconsumptive Uses of 
Whales, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 937, 962 (1985); Birnie, IWC-A New Era: 33rd Meeting of the 
International Whaling Commission, 6 MARINE POL'y 74, 75 (1982). For a review of this 
meeting, see Birnie, Countdown to Zero, 7 MARINE POL'y 64 (1983). 
A ban on the use of the nonexplosive, cold harpoon was also voted for at the 1981 IWC 
meeting. INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMM'N, 31st Report 25 (1981); 2 P. BIRNIE, INTERNA-
TIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING 612 (1985). Brazil, Iceland, Japan, Norway, and the Soviet 
Union lodged objections to the ban. Id. at 626 n. 76. 
45 Review of the 33m Int'l Whaling Comm'n Meeting, supra note 9, at 11. For a compre-
hensive review of this meeting, see 2 P. BIRNIE, supra note 44, at 608-13. 
46 2 P. BIRNIE, supra note 44, at 610. 
47 Id. at 611. 
48 Id. at 612. 
49 See Review of the 34th International Whaling Commission Meeting, supra note 10, at 
17-19. The 1982 amendment states: 
[C]atch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for 
the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. The 
provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 
1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the 
effects of the decision on whale stocks and consider modifications of this provision 
and the establishment of other catch limits. 
ICRW, supra note 2, Schedule, para. lO(e) , reprinted in 2 P. BIRNIE, supra note 44, at 615. 
50 See Review of the 34th Int'l Whaling Comm'n Meeting, supra note 10, at 17-19. See also 
2 P. BIRNIE, supra note 44, at 614-15. 
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tunity to gather scientific data on the populations and distributions 
of whale stocks to assess whether commercial whaling could be 
resumed safely in the future. Of the thirty-nine member nations of 
the IWC, only Japan, the Soviet Union, and Norway filed objections 
to the moratorium. 51 Brazil, Iceland, Peru, Spain, and the Republic 
of Korea, which at the time of the 1982 meeting allowed commercial 
whaling, stated that they were "committed to the implementation of 
the moratorium. "52 
The IWC, in spite of its achievements, has several limitations. 53 
First, the Commission has jurisdiction only over contracting govern-
ments. Whalers, for example, have contravened IWC regulations by 
establishing "flags of convenience" for their vessels in non-member 
countries and "joint ventures" with entities of non-member coun-
tries. 54 For the same reasons, the IWC has no control over pirate 
whaling as well. 55 Second, the Commission's schedules and other 
decisions, including moratoriums, are subject to "objections" that 
legally permit an objecting member to avoid IWC decisions alto-
gether. 56 Such an objection exempts a member country from any 
obligation to comply with the whaling limit unless and until the 
objection is withdrawn. Finally, under the terms of the Convention, 
the IWC has no power to impose sanctions for quota violations. 57 
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the IWC has made noteworthy 
advancements in conserving whale stocks. As noted by Malcolm J. 
Forster, Legal Counsel to the Seychelles, the IWC "is by no means 
a perfect vehicle for conservation, but in practical terms what else 
is there?"58 
61 Those nations that voted in favor of the moratorium included: Antigua, Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Belize, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, France, West Germany, India, Kenya, Mexico, 
Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Senegal, Seychelles, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. There were 5 abstentions: 
Chile, People's Republic of China, Phillipines, South Africa, and Switzerland. (Switzerland 
explained that it did not regard the ban as justified by the scientific advice available.) Dominica 
and Jamaica were absent. 2 P. BIRNIE, supra note 44, at 613-15. 
62 REPORT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE 35TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE INT'L 
WHALING COMM'N, Brighton, England, July 1983, at 10; see 2 P. BIRNIE, supra note 44, at 
625-27. 
63 See Leggett, Inte'l""fULtional Whaling Policy, 7 MARINE POL'y REPORTS 1 (1985). 
64 See generally B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE-AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY 
(1962). 
66 See generally P. BIRNIE, LEGAL MEASURES FOR THE PREVENTION OF "PIRATE" WHAL-
ING (1982). 
66 ICRW, supra note 2, at 1719, art. V, para. 3. 
67 See Leggett, supra note 53, at 1. 
6B Forster, !We Makes Some Progress, 5 ENVT'L POL'y & L. 170, 174 (1977). 
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III. DOMESTIC POLICY ON MARINE MAMMAL PRESERVATION 
A. General Overview 
The United States historically has led the world in protecting 
whales and other threatened marine mammals from needless exter-
mination. 59 For the past two decades, Congress has adopted new, 
and amended existing, legislation to strengthen national conserva-
tion goals. 6O In 1969, for example, Congress amended the Endan-
gered Species Preservation Act of 1966 (the "Act") to include wildlife 
threatened with worldwide extinction. 61 Before 1969, the Act only 
protected national wildlife threatened with extinction. The Act now 
protects species found in foreign jurisdictions or on the high seas, 
and prohibits their importation into the United States. 62 More im-
portantly, the amendments also require the federal government to 
promote bilateral and multilateral treaties to protect endangered 
wildlife. 63 
In 1972 Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMP A)64 prohibiting the taking and importation of any marine 
59 For a comparison of the environmental goals of the United States, Japan, and the Soviet 
Union, see D. KELLEY, K. STUNKEL & R. WESCOTT, THE ECONOMIC SUPERPOWERS AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT (1976). 
60 For an account of congressional efforts in developing wildlife protection laws, see M. 
BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (rev. expanded ed. 1983). 
61 Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 3(a), 83 Stat. 275 
(1969) (amending the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 86-669, § 1, 
80 Stat. 926 (1966» (repealed 1973). When a species is "listed," it becomes a protected species 
and sanctions can be imposed for a violation of the statute. Id. at § 3(a). 
62 Id. at § 2. 
63 Id. at § 5(a). 
64 Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, § 107, 86 Stat. 1027 (1977) 
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982» [hereinafter MMPA]. The major impetus for the 
passage of the MMP A was the high porpoise mortality level incidental to commercial yellowfin 
tuna fishermen using purse seine nets. "Incidental" taking is that which occurs when fishing 
for other species, frequently during purse seine fishing operations. Porpoises are caught in a 
fishing net and, because they are mammals, they drown. See Nafziger & Armstrong, The 
Porpoise-Tuna Controversy: Management of Marine Resources After Committee for Humane 
Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 7 ENVT'L L. 223 (1977). Due to the Act's incidental take 
requirement, porpoise mortality caused by United States fishing interests has been reduced 
substantially. Congress noted in 1981: 
[S]ince the passage of the [A]ct, the annual loss of porpoise has been reduced from 
more than 400,000 animals to approximately 20,000, a reduction of more than 95 
percent, due to improvements in fish gear and in fishing techniques developed by 
[the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)] in cooperation with 
the tuna industry. NOAA has recently established a 5-year industry quota of 20,500 
porpoises per year, an economically and technologically achievable level which rep-
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mammal by any person or vessel subject to United States jurisdiction 
unless a permit is obtained from the federal government. 65 The 
MMPA defines the "taking" of any marine mammal as any hunting, 
capture, killing, or harassment. 66 Permits, however, may be issued 
for scientific research, public display, or takings incidental to com-
mercial fishing operations.67 In addition, the MMP A requires the 
federal government to initiate bilateral and multilateral agreements 
to promote the policies and goals of the United States under the 
Act.68 This obligation prompted the federal government to lobby the 
IWC for a moratorium on whaling. 69 
The United States is also a signatory of the Convention of Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES).70 This treaty, which now has over eighty signatories, reg-
ulates international trade in over 1,000 animal and plant species 
threatened with extinction. CITES requires species to be listed 
according to the extent to which they are or may be affected by 
international trade in their products.71 Trade in these listed species 
is limited to noncommercial purposes.72 All species of large ceta-
ceans, except the Bryde's and minke whales, are listed as threat-
ened. This Convention is distinguished from the ICRW in that 
resents a 60 percent reduction in porpoise mortality since 1978. S. Rep. No. 63, 97th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981). 
For an analysis of the tuna-porpoise controversy, see Andersen, Andersen & Searles, The 
Tuna-Porpoise Dilemma: Is Conflict Resolution Attainable? 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 505 
(1978); for an analysis of MMPA, see Coggins, Legal Protection for Marine Mammals: An 
Overview of Innovative Resource Conservation Legislation, 6 ENVTL. L. 1 (1975); Erdheim, 
The Immediate Goal Test of the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Tuna/Porpoise 
Controversy, 9 ENVT'L L. 283 (1979); Comment, Dolphin Conservation in the Tuna Industry: 
The United States' Role in an International Problem, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 665 (1979). 
66 MMPA, supra note 64, at § 1371. The MMPA exempts Alaska Arctic Eskimos who hunt 
marine mammals for nutritional needs and for creating native handicrafts or clothing. Id. at 
§ 1371(b). 
66 MMPA, supra note 64, at § 1362(12). 
67 Id. at § 1371(a). Before issuing a permit, the federal government must estimate the 
current stock size of the species in question and determine whether the proposed taking has 
an impact on the optimum sustainable population. Id. at § 1373(d). The MMPA also requires 
from foreign governments letters of compliance if they wish to export tuna into the United 
States. Id. at § 1371(a)(2). 
68 Id. at § 1378(a)(1)-(6). 
69 Fish and Wildlife Miscellaneous-Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries 
and Wildlife Conservation and the Env't of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 336 (1979). 
70 Convention on International Trade in Endangerment of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 
Mar. 3, 1973, Multilateral, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1085 
(1973). 
71 CITES, supra note 70, art. 2. 
72 Id. at art. 3(c). 
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CITES lacks a quota-setting, or regulatory body, analogous to the 
IWC. The rules of CITES thus apply only to the import and export 
of endangered wildlife and do not apply to the actual taking of 
wildlife. Congress, however, in 1978 passed an amendment to pro-
vide an enforcement mechanism for CITES.73 
B. Pelly Amendment 
In 1971 Congress enacted the Pelly Amendment to provide effec-
tive sanctions against countries which fail to conduct fishing opera-
tions in accord with international fishery conservation programs. 74 
The Pelly Amendment provided indirect enforcement power to in-
ternational conservation programs where none existed before. 
Though this legislation was originally drafted in response to Den-
mark's overfishing of North American Atlantic salmon, the Amend-
ment protects cetaceans as well. 75 Representative Pelly outlined the 
Amendment's express intent to support IWC quotas, stating: 
73 See H.R. REP. No. 1029, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 1768,1779. In the House debate, Representative Leggett outlined the purpose 
of the amendment. He noted: 
[I]n order to expand the success the United States has achieved in the conservation 
of fish and particularly whales under section 8 of the act-better known as the Pelly 
amendment-a number of conservation organizations strongly suggested the use of 
the Pelly amendment concept to extend additional protection to endangered and 
threatened species of wildlife. 
. . . The amendment adopted by the committee would allow, the Pelly amendment 
to be invoked in order to prohibit imports of any wildlife products from the offending 
nations whenever a determination is made by the Secretary of the Interior or the 
Secretary of Commerce, for instance, that wildlife products protected under the 
Convention [CITES] are being shipped between two nations and that the actions of 
such nations are diminishing the effectiveness of an international program for endan-
gered or threatened species. 
124 Congo Rec. 9280 (1978). Similarly, Representative Murphy explained that: 
[This amendment] would use-what is known as the Pelly amendment concept-to 
extend additional protection to endangered and threatened species of wildlife. In 
accomplishing this purpose, the bill would prohibit imports of any wildlife products 
from offending nations whenever the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of 
Commerce determines that wildlife products protected under the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora are being 
shipped between two nations and that the actions of such nations are diminishing the 
effectiveness of an international program for endangered or threatened species. 
[d. at 25,415 [to avoid confusing the 1971 Pelly Amendment with the 1978 Amendment, the 
1978 Amendment is hereinafter referred to as the CITES Amendment]: 
7422 U.S.C. § 1978-1980 (1982). 
76 See 117 Congo Rec. 34,752 (1971). Though the exploitation of Atlantic salmon was regu-
lated by the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), Feb. 
8,1949,1 U.S.T. 477, T.I.A.S. No. 2089,157 U.N.T.S. 157, this migratory fish was threatened 
by the overfishing of Danish fishermen. In response, the International Northwest Atlantic 
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The saga of the Atlantic salmon unfortunately is being repeated 
around the world with respect to many other creatures that 
inhabit the seas, most notably the whale. Commercial pressure 
has virtually wiped out the largest and most awesome species of 
whale. The International Whaling Convention, far from being a 
conservation measure, has proven to be a cloak for over-exploi-
tation on a grand scale. 76 
The Pelly Amendment requires the Secretary of Commerce to 
certify to the President if "nationals of a foreign country, directly or 
indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner or under 
circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international 
fishery conservation program. . . ."77 After receiving a certification, 
the President may direct the Secretary to prohibit the importation 
of fish products from the offending nation into the United States. 78 
Though the Amendment gives the President the discretion to impose 
sanctions, the President is required to notify Congress in sixty days 
of any action taken as a result of the certification, or his reasons for 
taking no action against the offending nation. 79 
After enactment, the Pelly Amendment was brought into action 
on numerous occasions. In November of 1974, the Secretary of Com-
merce certified both Japan and the Soviet Union for violating IWC 
. whaling quotas. The Secretary stated in his certification letter: 
In the case of the minke whale, a quota of 5,000 whales was set 
for the Antarctic. . . . The Soviet Union and Japan voted against 
this quota, stated their view that the figure should be 8,000, 
took formal objection80 to the quota, and announced that each 
would take 4,000 minke whales during the 1973-1974 season. In 
fact, the Soviet Union took 4,000 and Japan took 3,713. This 
represented an excess of 2,713, or approximately fifty percent 
over quota.81 
Fishing Commission, the regulatory entity promulgated by the ICNAF, called for a total ban 
on the taking of Atlantic salmon. Denmark filed an objection to the moratorium and was 
effectively exempt. See 117 Congo Rec. 34,751 (1971). 
76 117 Congo Rec. at 34, 752. 
77 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(I)(1982). 
78 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(4). 
79 22 U.S.C. § 1978(b). 
80 At the IWC meeting in June 1974, both countries switched their position. On October 3, 
1974, the IWC notified all members that no nations had filed objections to the quotas adopted 
at the June 1974 meeting. Circular Communication to All Contracting Governments, October 
3, 1974,25 U.S.T. 2978. 
81 Letter from Frederick B. Dent, United States Secretary of Commerce, to Gerald R. 
Ford, President of the United States (Nov. 12, 1974). Though Secretary Dent certified Japan 
and the Soviet Union, he advised against imposing sanctions pursuant to the Pelly Amend-
ment. The Secretary recommended that "[s]ince trade sanctions would entail important do-
1987] BALDRIGEIMURAZUMI 271 
The Secretary thus found that both Japan and the Soviet Union 
acted to "diminish the effectiveness" of the Convention. Former 
President Ford chose not to impose sanctions, however, when both 
countries agreed to accept the 1974-1975 IWC quotas.82 
In December of 1978, the Secretary again certified several coun-
tries including Chile, Peru, and the Republic of Korea for exceeding 
IWC quotas. 83 The Secretary found that by exceeding intentionally 
IWC quotas, these countries diminished the effectiveness of the 
ICRW.84 Though none of these nations were IWC members at the 
time of certification, within two months of the certification, all three 
had either joined the IWC or committed themselves to join by the 
next annual meeting. While these nations assured further compliance 
with IWC decisions, the Secretary nevertheless certified them for 
past violations. 85 
In sum, the Secretary of Commerce certified to the President 
between 1971 and 1978 five nations that exceeded IWC quotas and 
thus diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW's conservation ef-
forts. Yet on each of these occasions, the President exercised his 
discretion and imposed no sanctions on the offending nation. 
c . Packwood-Magnuson Amendment 
The 1979 Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act of 197686 was enacted in response to 
the executive branch's refusal to impose sanctions against offending 
nations.87 The Amendment provides that the Secretary of Commerce 
mestic costs and could generate significant friction in our relations with Japan and the 
u. s. s. R., such restriction should be imposed only as a remedy of last resort after all reasonable 
alternatives for the achievement of the conservation objective have proven ineffective." ld. 
at 2. 
82 See The President's Message to the Congress Submitting a Report on International 
Whaling Operation and Conservation Programs, 11 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 55, 55-56 
(Jan. 16, 1975) [hereinafter President's Message to Congress]; see also Brief for the Respon-
dents, supra note 11, at 22-23. President Ford also accepted Secretary Dent's recommendation 
not to impose sanctions. ld. at 55. 
83 Message to Congress Transmitting a Report, 15 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 265,265-
66 (Feb. 13, 1979). 
84 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 11, at 23-24. 
86ld. at 23. 
86 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1982). 
87 During congressional hearings on the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, Congress 
was well aware of the weak certification process under the 1971 Pelly Amendment. Hearing 
on Whaling Operations Conducted Outside the Control of the lnt'l Whaling Comm'n Before 
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1979). 
Congress also reviewed the whaling practices of Peru, Chile, and the Republic of Korea during 
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is responsible to ascertain and certify whether "nationals of a foreign 
country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations or 
engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of 
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling."88 The 
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment mandates that upon certification, 
the offending nation's fisheries allocation in United States waters 
"shall be reduced by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary [of Commerce], by not less than 50 percent."89 The Amend-
ment thus removes the executive's discretion to impose or refuse 
sanctions after certification under the 1971 Pelly Amendment and 
requires the imposition of economic sanctions against offending na-
tions that meet the "diminishes the effectiveness" standard. 
IV. AMERICAN CETACEAN SOCIETY III 
In contravention of the 1981 IWC zero quota for North Pacific 
sperm whales and the 1982 IWC moratorium on all commercial whal-
ing, Japanese whalers continued to harvest whales.90 During the fall 
of 1984, the threat of sanctions under the Pelly and Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments encouraged Japan to negotiate with the 
United States to avoid a confrontation. In the event of certification, 
Japan would lose fishing rights worth at least $250 million. 91 Bilateral 
discussions were conducted in Washington, D.C., during November 
1984. 
In response to Japan's whaling activities, several environmental 
organizations filed suit on November 8, 1984, requesting that the 
District Court order Secretary Baldrige to certify Japan under the 
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments.92 Plaintiffs contended 
the 1979 Packwood Amendment hearings. See Hearings on Whaling Policy and Int'l Whaling 
Comm'n Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the 
Env't of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 312 
(1979); see also Brief for the Respondents, supra note 11, at 24-25. 
Ironically, President Carter reported to Congress that the frequent violations of IWC quotas 
by Chile, Peru, and the Republic of Korea were the basis for certification. Message to Congress 
Transmitting a Report, supra note 83, at 266-67. 
88 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A) (1982); see also 125 Congo Rec. 21742 (1979). 
89 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(B) (1982). 
90 See Brief for Respondents, supra note 11, at 10. 
91 Japanese fishermen catch approximately $500 million worth of fish within United States 
waters annually. Japan Agrees to End Whaling, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1985, at 2, col. 4. 
92 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs also requested: (1) a declaratory 
judgment that the Secretary's failure to certify violated both the Pelly and Packwood Amend-
ments, because any whaling activities in excess of IWC quotas necessarily "diminishes the 
effectiveness" of the ICRW; and (2) a permanent injunction prohibiting any executive agree-
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that certification is mandatory and nondiscretionary where harvest-
ing is in excess of IWC quotas. 93 
Notwithstanding the pending action, the Secretary on November 
13,1984, reached an executive agreement with Japan whereby Japan 
pledged to cease all commercial whaling by 1988,94 and the Secretary 
agreed that the United States would forego certifying Japan under 
the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments if Japan complied 
with its pledge.95 The agreement permitted the Japanese to take 400 
sperm whales in each of the 1984 and 1985 seasons, 200 sperm whales 
in each of the 1986 and 1987 seasons, and an "acceptable" number of 
Bryde's and minke whales in the 1986 and 1987 seasons. 96 The agree-
ment also required Japan to withdraw its objections to the IWC's 
moratorium. Indeed, this agreement permitted Japan to continue 
violating IWC quotas with no threat of sanctions by the United 
States. 
On March 5, 1985, the District Court issued an order and opinion 
granting the plaintiffs' relief and ordered the Secretary to certify 
Japan. 97 The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's ruling on 
August 6, 1985.98 The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the 
lower courts and held that the Secretary of Commerce is not required 
to certify every nation taking whales in excess of IWC quotas. 99 The 
ment which would violate the certification and sanction requirements of the Amendments. 
American Cetacean Society I, 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (D.D.C. 1985). 
!IS American Cetacean Society I, 604 F. Supp. at 1405 . 
.. This agreement permits Japan to continue whaling for two years after the moratorium 
goes into effect. See Letter from Malcolm Baldrige, United States Secretary of Commerce, 
to Yasushi Murazumi, Charge d'Affaires ad interium of Japan (Nov. 13, 1984), reprinted in 
Cert. Appendix, supra note 14, at 107a. 
96 See supra note 14. 
96 See Summary of Discussions on Commercial Sperm Whaling in the Western Division 
Stock of the North Pacific (Nov. 9-12, 1984), reprinted in Cert. Appendix, supra note 14, at 
100a-106a. 
f11 American Cetacean Society I, 604 F. Supp. at 1411. In response to the District Court's 
decision, Japan unilaterally indicated that it would not, as agreed, withdraw its objections to 
the IWC moratorium until after the Court of Appeals rules in favor of the federal government. 
See letter from Shintaro Abe, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, to Malcolm Baldrige, 
Secretary of Commerce (April 5, 1985), reprinted in Cert. Appendix, supra note 14, at 116a-
11Sa. 
98 American Cetacean Society II, 768 F.2d at 445. 
99 American Cetacean Society III, 106 S. Ct. at 2872. The Court also held that the political 
question doctrine did not foreclose judicial determination of the case. Justice White stated: 
We are cognizant of the interplay between these Amendments and the conduct of 
this Nation's foreign relations, and we recognize the premier role which both Con-
gress and the Executive play in this field. But under the Constitution, one of the 
judiciary'S characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this 
responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones. 
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Court thus found that the Secretary had the discretion to determine 
in what circumstances an offending nation's conduct "diminishes the 
effectiveness" of international conservation measures. 
The majority opinion, written by Justice White, based its decision 
on the fact that the legislative histories of both amendments did not 
define explicitly the "diminish the effectiveness" standard. 1OO Even 
though they conceded that "[t]he language of the Pelly and Pack-
wood-Magnuson Amendments might reasonably be construed [to 
require the Secretary to automatically certify offending nations]," 
the majority found that the Secretary's interpretation of the statutes 
was reasonable. 101 Hence, the Secretary's decision to secure an end 
to all Japanese commercial whaling and future compliance with IWC 
quotas in lieu of economic sanctions was a reasonable construction 
of the amendments. The standard set out by the Court was that the 
Secretary may not "refuse to certify deliberate flouting of [IWC] 
schedules. "102 Moreover, the Court noted that "if a statute is silent 
or ambiguous with respect to the question at issue, our longstanding 
practice is to defer to the 'executive department's construction of a 
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer' . . . . "103 
The majority also gave weight to a report from the Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries Committee to the 1978 CITES Amendment. 
We conclude, therefore, that the present cases present a justiciable controversy, and 
turn to the merits of petitioners' arguments. 
Id. at 2866 (footnote omitted). 
The rationale of the political question doctrine is that certain issues are better resolved by 
the political branches of the government than by the judicial branch. The Court in Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), outlined the criteria for determining whether an issue is a political 
question or not. Justice Harlan for the majority stated: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a 
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolv-
ing it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question. 
Id. For a discussion of the political question doctrine, see Henkin, Is There a "Political 
Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Champlin & Schwarz, Political Question 
Doctrine and Allocation of the Foreign Affairs Powers, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215 (1985); 
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 
517 (1966). 
100 106 S. Ct, at 2867. 
1011d. 
102 I d. at 2868. 
103 Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984». 
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The report, addressing the "diminish the effectiveness" standard, 
stated: 
The nature of any trade or taking which qualifies as diminishing 
the effectiveness of any international program for endangered 
or threatened species will depend on the circumstances of each 
case. In general, however, the trade or taking must be serious 
enough to warrant the finding that the effectiveness of the in-
ternational program in question has been diminished. An iso-
lated, individual violation of a convention provision will not or-
dinarily warrant certification under this section. 104 
The majority reasoned that this statement made it clear that the 
Secretary has discretion to determine whether the activities of a 
nation "diminish the effectiveness" of CITES. By analogy, the Court 
found that this definition was applicable to the 1971 Pelly Amend-
ment as well. 105 "Without strong evidence to the contrary, we doubt 
that Congress intended the same phrase to have significantly differ-
ent meanings in two adjoining paragraphs of the same subsection."l06 
Justice Marshall questioned the Court's approach to resolving the 
issue. In his dissenting opinion, he maintained that by focusing 
entirely on the question of executive branch discretion, the majority 
overlooked the fact that Secretary Baldrige himself admitted that 
violations of IWC quotas diminishes the effectiveness of the 
ICRW.107 Justice Marshall reasoned that Congress and the Execu-
tive branch had a shared understanding that IWC quota violations 
were the type of activity that triggered certification under the Pelly 
and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 108 
This case typifies the emotive character of environmental litiga-
tion. It illustrates the tension between environmentalists and the 
whaling industry, lO9 the United States and Japan as trading par-
ties,110 and between the legislative and executive branches over their 
respective authority to govern foreign affairs. III 
104 Id. at 2869-70 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1029, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1978), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1768, 1779). 
106 American Cetacean Society III, 106 S. Ct. at 2870. The Court of Appeals, however, held 
that the definition found in the House Report was limited to the CITES Amendment. Id. 
100 Id. 
107Id. at 2873 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
lOB Id. at 2875 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
109 See supra note 38. 
110 Japan's global trade surplus for 1986 was $82.6 billion. The United States trade deficit 
with Japan alone was $60 billion for that year. Jameson, Japan's Global Trade Surplus Soars 
79% to Record $82.6 Billion in Year, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1987, § 4, at 1, col. 1. 
III Under article I of the United States Constitution, Congress is empowered to "regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes." U.S. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS 
There are a number of problems with the Supreme Court's hold-
ing. First, the Secretary's actions were contrary to the majority's 
own standard that the Secretary may not refuse to certify intentional 
and flagrant disregard of IWC quotas. Not only did the majority 
overlook that the Secretary himself acknowledged that any IWC 
quota violation diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW, it also 
failed to take into consideration Japan's flagrant and continuous 
efforts to defeat international whaling regulations. Indeed, the cir-
cumstances of this case certainly meet the Court's requirements for 
certification under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 
Second, by giving the Secretary the discretion to determine when a 
nation's activities diminish the effectiveness of the ICRW, the de-
cision effectively sterilizes the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment by 
creating an option for the executive branch in dealing with future 
IWC quota violations. 
A. The Court's Standard and Secretary Baldrige's Abuse of 
Discretion 
The majority held that the Secretary may not "refuse to certify 
deliberate flouting of [IWC] schedules. "112 Yet the Court reasoned 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court has broadly construed this power. See, e.g., Japan Line, 
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448-51 (1979); Brolan v. United States, 236 
U.S. 216, 222 (1915). The Executive branch is required to implement, rather than undermine, 
the laws enacted by Congress. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see, e.g., Kendall v. United States 
ex rei. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
The Executive Branch has historically made over 1,300 treaties and thousands of interna-
tional agreements. See L. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 8 (1984). 
See generally Goldwater, The President's Constitutional Primacy in Foreign Relations and 
National Defense, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 463 (1973); Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the 
President to Conclude International Agreements, 64 YALE L.J. 345 (1954); Rovine, Separation 
of Powers and International Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J. 397 (1977). The source of 
the President's power to enter into executive agreements is article II of the U.S. Constitution. 
Article II, section'l, clause 1 provides: U[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President 
of the United States of America." Article II, section 2, clause 2 provides: U[h]e shall have 
Power, by and with Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties ... ; and he shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Counsuls .... " Article II, section 3, clause 1 provides: U[h]e shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . ." 
Many writers challenge the President's authority to conclude executive agreements. See 
Sparkman, Checks and Balances in American Foreign Policy, 52 IND. L.J. 433 (1977); Berger, 
The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972); Borchard, Shall 
the Executive Agreement Replace the Treaty?, 53 YALE L.J. 664 (1944). 
112 American Cetacean Society III, 106 S. Ct. at 2867. 
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that where certain circumstances justify, the Secretary has the dis-
cretion to withhold certification. 113 In arguing for discretion, the 
Secretary contended that the issue of whaling, as a delicate foreign 
affairs question, called for diplomatic compromise to avoid confron-
tation. 114 The federal government extolled: "[The BaldrigelMura-
zumi] agreement is a salutory achievement; it has produced, for the 
first time, a binding commitment from the world's premier whaling 
nation to comply with a comprehensive commercial whaling mora-
torium. The Agreement advances the worldwide interest in preserv-
ing whale populations. "115 The Court likewise reasoned that the Bald-
rigelMurazumi Agreement produces results similar or superior to 
the immediate certification and imposition of economic sanctions. 116 
This conclusion is not borne out by reality. Japan has no intention 
of dismantling its whaling industry. It also has no intention of dis-
couraging the importation of whale products from non-signatory 
countries and unregulated whaling operations. In the past, Japan 
has habitually violated the spirit and letter of the International 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. ll7 For example, Japan 
113Id. at 2867. The majority stated: 
Id. 
In these circumstances, the Secretary, after consultation with the United States 
Commissioner to the IWC and review of the IWC Scientific Committee opinions, 
determined that it would better serve the conservation ends of the Convention to 
accept Japan's pledge to limit its harvest of sperm whales for four years and to cease 
all commercial whaling in 1988, rather than to impose sanctions and risk continued 
whaling by the Japanese. 
114 Japan Whaling Association v. American CetacElan Society, Brief for the Federal Peti-
tioners at 42--43, 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) [hereinafter Brief for the Federal Petitioners]. 
Secretary Baldrige explained the difficulty of resolving the whaling issue, stating: 
Japan is by far the most significant of the few remaining whaling nations. Not only 
do Japanese whalers account for the largest share of all whales harvested on a global 
basis, but Japan provides the export market for many of the whales harvested by 
nationals of other countries, including the Soviet Union. I believe that a cessation of 
all Japanese commercial whaling activities would contribute more to the effectiveness 
of the IWC and its conservation program than any other single development. 
Id. at 43, n.50. 
116Id. at 10. 
116 American Cetacean Society III, 106 S. Ct. at 2872. Japan's history in keeping promises 
in respect to whaling agreements is questionable. In 1937, Japan pledged to follow the quota 
limits of the Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling and Final Act but reneged on its 
promise. In the two years following the 1937 Agreement, Japan's total production increased 
from 9 percent to 15 percent and then to 21 percent. See Griffis, The Conservation o/Whales, 
5 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 99, 104 n.30 (1972); Travalio & Clement, supra note 4, at 209. 
117 Japan's history of violating international law is well documented. See, e.g., Frizell, The 
Pirate Whalers Versus the Environmentalists, OCEANS, Mar.-Aprill981, at 25-26; Carothers, 
Assault on the Whales: How Long Can They Endure "So Wide a Chase", GREENPEACE 
EXAMINER, Jan.-Mar. 1985, at 14. 
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has played a significant role in "pirate" whaling operations. U8 Many 
of these unregulated activities are owned, operated, and manned by 
Japanese nationals. u9 The whale products of these operations are 
exported to Japan. 120 Because their flag-states are not members of 
the ICRW, these "pirate" whaling operations do not violate inter-
national law. Such "flags of convenience" operations, however, are 
in violation of the spirit of the ICRW.121 
In addition, Japan has violated several quotas, including the quota 
which is the subject of American Cetacean Society III litigation, for 
many stocks of whales and other marine mammals. In 1976, for 
example, after the IWC voted a zero quota on Bryde's whales, Japan 
harvested several hundred animals in contravention of the quota. 122 
Japan, issuing itself a permit, claimed an exception under the "sci-
entific research" exception. 123 Moreover, Japan has been charged 
with the questionable killing of Dall's porpoises124 and bottleneck 
dolphins. 125 
More importantly, Japan violates all political ethics when dealing 
with the IWC, its members, and its policies. This is especially true 
with Japan's treatment of economically weak IWC member coun-
tries. For example, in 1978 Japan threatened to cancel a $10 million 
sugar purchase with Panama in retaliation for placing an anti-whal-
118 The most notorious "pirate" whaling vessel was the Sierra, owned, operated and manned 
by Japanese nationals. At the end of each voyage, the Sierra usually unloaded about 250 tons 
of whale meat worth about $750,000. In 1979, the Sea Shepard, a vessel financed by the Fund 
for Animals, rammed the Sierra. For an account of Sierra's exploits, see Frizell, supra note 
117, at 25. See also Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 4, at 336. 
The Japanese government also subsidizes its whaling industry. In 1978 the Japanese gov-
ernment paid a $10 million subsidy after the Taiyo Fisheries Company, which owns a 30 
percent interest in the Japan Joint Whaling Company, lost $20 million in its whaling operation. 
ANIMAL WELFARE INSTITUTE INFORMATION REPORT, Feb.-Mar. 1979, at 1. 
119 See Frizell, supra note 117, at 25-27. 
120 [d. 
121 [d. 
122 See Scarff II, supra note 4, at 634; M'Gonigle, supra note 4, at 155; Kindt & Wintheiser, 
supra note 4, at 339. 
123 See Scarff II, supra note 4, at 634; McGonigle, supra note 4, at 155; Kindt & Wintheiser, 
supra note 4 at 339. 
124 See Nafziger & Armstrong, supra note 64, at 598; Scarff I, supra note 4, 379-80; Travalio 
& Clement, supra note 4, at 202; Kindt & Wintheiser, supra note 4, at 344; see also NAT'L 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT'L MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF 
COMMERCE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE INCIDENTAL TAKE OF 
DALL PORPOISE IN THE JAPANESE SALMON FISHERY 1, 9 (May 1981). 
125 In 1978, the natives of several Japanese islands slaughtered between 1,000 and 2,000 
bottleneck dolphins claiming the mammals interfered with fisheries costing them $2.5 million 
annually in lost income. For an account of the dolphin hunt, see Whymant, Can the Japanese 
Dolphins Survive the Fishing War, OCEANS, July 1978, at 55; see also Kindt & Wintheiser, 
supra note 4, at 343. 
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ing proposal on the agenda at the IWe's 1978 meeting. 126 On the 
first morning of the session, Panama withdrew this item from the 
agenda. Japan routinely denied all accusations of applying economic 
pressure to Panama. 127 In 1986, Jamaica was another victim of Ja-
pan's political maneuvering. Once a forceful voice in IWe delibera-
tions, Jamaica withdrew its membership after Japan threatened to 
cancel purchases of Jamaican coffee if the government continued its 
anti-whaling orientation. 128 Japan is also accused of paying the IWe 
dues and offering other economic aid to several other third-world 
countries to sway them into the whaling camp. 129 
In addition, Japan uses its semantic genius in an attempt to re-
define the meaning of such terms as "aboriginal" or "subsistence" 
whaling and "scientific research" whaling to permit its nationals to 
continue commercial whaling under the guise of legitimate practices 
sanctioned by the IWe. At the thirty-eighth Annual Meeting of the 
IWe in June of 1986, Japan endeavored to establish a relationship 
between its whaling and the aboriginal whaling quotas of Alaska and 
Greenland. 130 Moreover, Japan placed a proposal on the agenda for 
the 1987 meeting to reclassify its coastal whaling as aboriginal or 
subsistence whaling, effectively avoiding IWe commercial whaling 
regulations. 13l The IWe, however, has so far distinguished coastal 
whaling from aboriginal whaling. 132 
In short, the Baldrige/Murazumi Agreement simply buys time for 
Japan. It is evident that Japan is actively and aggressively under-
taking a campaign of intimidation to rescind the 1982 moratorium by 
126 See M'Gonigle, supra note 4, at 160-61. 
127Id. 
128 See WHALENEWS, Autumn 1986, at 3. 
129 Id. The editor's of WhaleNews note: 
Id. 
For several years the small islands of St. Vincent and St. Lucia had been part of the 
anti-whaling bloc within the IWe .... It was soon learned that the prime ministers 
of these two economically-depressed islands had been given the red carpet treatment 
in Japan, to which they had been invited by the Japanese government. A few days 
before the IWe meeting started, the arrears due the IWe were paid and economic 
aid was offered. Two new commissioners and the accompanying delegations were 
also appointed by the countries' governments. 
130 MARINE MAMMAL NEWS, May-June 1986, at 2. For a review of the 38th annual IWe 
meeting, see Phillips, Is There a Whaling Moratorium?, 11 MARINE POL'y 76 (1987). 
131 WHALE NEWS, supra note 128, at 3-4. The Japanese approached an IWe Working Group 
with the same proposal only a few weeks after the BaldrigelMurazumi Agreement. See Brief 
for the Respondents, supra note 11, at 11-12. Japaj's proposal is weak at best given that "the 
so-called shore-based whale fishery in Hokkaido Island is not village-orientated but is actually 
run off a modern, high speed boat which distributes the minke whale meat throughout Japan." 
MARINE MAMMAL NEWS, Nov. 1986, at 3-4. 
132 MARINE MAMMAL NEWS, supra note 130, at 2. 
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increasing its polity. Neither the United States nor the international 
community should tolerate such threats and enticements. The ex-
ecutive branch, unfortunately, fell prey to this campaign. For what-
ever reason, political or economic,l33 the BaldrigelMurazumi Agree-
ment compromised congressional intent behind the Pelly and 
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments. 
Moreover, the Court ignored the fact that Secretary Baldrige 
himself admitted that Japan's whaling activities seriously "dimin-
ish[ed] the effectiveness" of the ICRW. On June 28, 1984, Senator 
Packwood wrote the Secretary seeking assurances that he would 
certify any nation that disregards IWC decisions. l34 Senator Pack-
wood wrote to Secretary Baldrige as follows: 
It has been assumed by everyone involved in this issue, including 
the whaling nations, that a nation which continues commercial 
whaling after the IWC moratorium takes effect would definitely 
be certified. I share this assumption since I see no way around 
the logical conclusion that a nation which ignores the moratorium 
is diminishing the effectiveness of the IWC. 
What I am asking, [Secretary Baldrige], is that you provige 
me with an assurance that it is the position of the Commerce 
Department that any nation which continues whaling after the 
moratorium takes effect will be certified under Packwood-Mag-
nuson. 135 
The Secretary responded on July 24, 1984, expressing his unequiv-
ocal agreement: 
You noted in your letter the widespread view that any continued 
commercial whaling after the International Whaling Commission 
(IWC) moratorium decision takes effect would be subject to 
certification. I agree, since any such whaling attributable to the 
policies of a foreign government would clearly diminish the ef-
fectiveness of the IWC.l36 
This letter, written less than four months before the Baldrige/ 
Murazumi Agreement, illustrates the Secretary's belief that Japa-
nese whaling activities diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW. 
Secretary Baldrige personally confirmed his commitment to punish 
violators of IWC decisions. The Secretary, however, renounced this 
133 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
134 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 11, at 38~9 (quoting letter from Senator 
Robert Packwood to Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce (June 28, 1984». 
136 Id. 
186 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 11, at ~9 (quoting letter from Malcolm 
Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce, to Senator Robert Packwood (July 24, 1984». 
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commitment with the Baldrige/Murazumi Agreement. Such foreign 
policy smacks of political arrogance and insensitivity to Congres-
sional intent. Representative Don Bonker in 1981 realized that pol-
itics should not playa role in the application of the Pelly and Pack-
wood-Magnuson Amendments. He explained: 
Where the evidence justifies its application, certification must 
not be held hostage to "policy" considerations. . . . The threat 
of these important amendments will continue to ring hollow un-
less they are utilized in a nonpolitical manner. 137 
In sum, the circumstances of this case certainly meet the Court's 
own standard for certification under the Pelly and Packwood-Mag-
nuson Amendments. The Secretary's decision to withhold certifica-
tion of Japan and the subsequent executive agreement is clearly an 
abuse of his administrative discretion. 
B. Sterilizing the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment 
The Supreme Court held that neither the Pelly nor the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendments define the phrase "diminish the effective-
ness" or specify factors to assist the Secretary in applying this 
standard. The Respondents contended that whaling in excess of IWC 
quotas automatically triggers certification under the 1979 Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment. 138 When the Amendment was introduced, 
the sponsors made it clear that this legislation was distinguishable 
from the 1971 Pelly Amendment. Representative Oberstar, for ex-
ample, clarified this point, stating: 
Mr. Speaker, to date, the Pelly amendment has been somewhat 
effective in encouraging compliance with fishery agreements. 
The major weakness has been that certification does not neces-
sarily impose any penalty on the violator. In fact, in all five 
certifications to date, the President has not used his discretion-
ary power to impose a penalty. In order to improve the effec-
tiveness of the Pelly amendment, the legislation before us will 
provide for a specific penalty to result from certification. 139 
137 Bonker, U.S. Policy and Strategy in the International Whaling Commission: Sinking 
or Swimming? 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 41, 52--53 (1982). 
138 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 11, at 13. 
139 125 Congo Rec. 22,083-84 (1979) (statement of Rep. Oberstar). Senator Packwood also 
emphasized this point, stating before the Senate: 
The core of the Packwood-Magnuson amendment is simply that any foreign nation 
which directly or indirectly conducts whaling operations or allows its nationals to 
conduct whaling operations or engage in trade in whale products in disregard of the 
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The Court, however, found the legislative history unpersuasive. 140 
Giving weight instead to a report given at Congressional Hearings 
on the 1978 CITES Amendment,141 the Court reasoned that the 
Secretary was vested with the discretion to determine when a coun-
try "diminishes the effectiveness" of any international conservation 
measure. The 1978 CITES Amendment, unlike the 1971 Pelly 
Amendment and the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, was 
designed to enforce a wholly different treaty, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora. 142 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned that it was "doubt[ful] 
that Congress intended the same phrase to have significantly differ-
ent meanings in two adjoining paragraphs of the same subsection. "143 
The Court's own statement, however, reveals a serious flaw. Given 
that the 1971 Pelly Amendment and 1978 CITES Amendment are 
conservation regulations of the International Whaling Commission shall be denied 
access to the rich fishery resources of our 200-mile zone. 
. . . This amendment. . . will prohibit those nations which violate the conservation 
regulations of the International Whaling Commission from fishing within our 200-
mile zone. As Senator Magnuson and I had initially drafted it, it would have prohibited 
them from totally fishing in the zone if they violated the conservation regulations, 
but it would not have prohibited it until their permit to fish within the zone had to 
be renewed, and that would be up to a year. 
Consequently, in working with the House managers we have reached a compromise 
which says that if any nation that fishes within the 200-mile zone violates the whaling 
conservation regulations, they will immediately, not having to wait until their permit 
can be renewed, lose 50 percent of their allocation for fishing within our 200-mile 
zone. If between that time and the time of the renewal of the permit they have not 
brought themselves in compliance with the regulations of the International Whaling 
Commission they will totally lose the right to fish in our 200-mile zone. 
The reason that this amendment will be so effective is because it is going to force 
Japan and Russia, which are the two principal violators of the International Whaling 
Commission regulations, to choose between the continued taking and/or buying of 
illegal whale meat, to choose between that privilege and the privilege of fishing in 
our 200-mile zone. The privilege of fishing in our 200-mile zone is an infinitely superior 
economic privilege and any country in its right mind when forced to the decision 
between fishing in the 200-mile zone and giving up illegal whaling is going to give up 
illegal whaling. This amendment would have the effect of forcing that decision, and 
it is probably the most significant step this country can take toward protecting the 
remaining whales of the world. 
125 Congo Rec. 21,742-43 (1979). 
140 American Cetacean Society III, 106 S. Ct. at 2871. 
141 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
142 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 11, at 36. 
The primary function of [CITES] is to regulate international trade in the species it 
protects. Its rules, however, apply only to import, export and reexport. The Con-
vention does not apply. . . to the taking of species, or to the preservation of habitat. 
Id. H.R. REP. No. 1029, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978). 
143 American Cetacean Society III, 106 S. Ct. at 2870. 
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in the same subsection, it sheds little light on the standard embodied 
in the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment which is under an 
entirely different title. 
The Court's holding effectively sterilizes the Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendment. By construing as similar the standards of certification 
under both the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, the 
Court grants the executive branch one standard with two options. 
Under the Court's interpretation, the executive branch may choose 
to (1) certify an offending nation under the 1971 Pelly Amendment, 
giving the President the discretion to impose or withhold sanctions; 
or (2) certify an offending nation under the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendment, requiring the immediate imposition of economic sanc-
tions with no executive discretion. Historically, the former is the 
preferred course of action for the President. 144 The latter, on the 
other hand, is the preferred course of action for the legislature. 145 
That Congress intended to create such an option is contrary to 
reason. Logic indicates that when a system malfunctions-such as 
the 1971 Pelly Amendment in light of the President's consistent 
refusal to impose sanctions on five separate occasions-the system 
must change. This was the role of the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendment and its automatic sanction provision. 
Certainly, the legislature could have worded the language in the 
1979 Amendment more clearly. Clarity, in 1979, was not an issue. 
Congress and the executive branch had a shared understanding that 
IWC quota violations always "diminish the effectiveness" of the 
ICRW. Such an understanding is evident when considering the con-
sistent interpretations of past Secretaries of Commerce in certifying 
every nation that departed from IWC schedules. 146 Clarity only be-
came a question when Secretary Baldrige, under pressure from 
Tokyo, became dissatisfied with the Packwood-Magnuson Amend-
ment. 
The negative impact of the Court's decision manifested itself 
quickly. On June 9, 1986, Secretary Baldrige certified to President 
Reagan that Norway had conducted whaling operations that dimin-
ished the effectiveness of the ICRW.147 Norway harvested minke 
144 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 11, at 4-6; see also Statement of Rep. Oberstar, 
supra at text accompanying note 139. 
145 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 11, at 4-6. 
146Id. 
147 President's Message to Congress on Norwegian Noncompliance with the International 
Whaling Commission's Program, 22 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 1045 (Aug. 4, 1986). For a 
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whales in the North Atlantic in violation of IWC zero quotas. The 
Secretary certified this country pursuant to the 1971 Pelly Amend-
ment. Four days after American Cetacean Society III was decided, 
on August 4, 1986, President Reagan-exercising his discretion un-
der the Pelly Amendment-announced that he was not imposing 
sanctions on the government of Norway in response to assurances 
of future compliance. 148 No mention was made of the 1979 Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment. The executive officers, choosing their own 
course of action, simply opted to apply only the 1971 Pelly Amend-
ment. Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, like an utterance of a 
prophet, foresaw the follies of the majority's approach. He com-
mented: 
It is uncontested here that Japan's taking of whales has been 
flagrant, consistent and substantial. Such gross disregard for 
international norms set for the benefit of the entire world rep-
resents the core of what Congress set about to punish and to 
deter with the weapon of reduced fishing rights in United States 
waters. The Court's decision today leaves Congress no closer to 
achieving that goal than it was in 1971, before either Amend-
ment was passed. 149 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court's holding in American Cetacean Society III 
is illogical. By not certifying Japan for violating IWC quotas, Sec-
retary Baldrige's actions were inconsistent with the majority's own 
standard. The Secretary's admission and subsequent repudiation, 
and his failure to take into consideration Japan's continuous disre-
gard of international conservation measures, demonstrate that the 
Baldrige/Murazumi agreement was an abuse of discretion. Indeed, 
the circumstances of this case certainly meet the Court's require-
ments for certification under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson 
Amendments. More importantly, the majority's decision sterilizes 
the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. In the case of future IWC 
violations, the executive branch can simply ignore the stringent 
sanctions of the 1979 Packwood-Magnuson Amendment for the more 
discussion of this situation, see WHALE NEWS, supra note 128, at 3; MARINE MAMMAL NEWS, 
supra note 130, at 1. 
148 President's Message to Congress on Norwegian Noncompliance with the International 
Whaling Commission's Conservation Program, 22 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. at 1045-46. 
149 American Cetacean Society III, 106 S.Ct. at 2876. ( , J., dissenting)(emphasis added). 
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flexible and lax 1971 Pelly Amendment. Congress did not intend 
such an illogical result. 
Rather than manipulate the wording in the statute, the Court 
should have focused on the realities of whaling regulation. The result 
of the Court's holding is to allow Japan to continue its whaling 
activities with impunity. The United States, as the former vanguard 
of marine mammal protection, is now an accomplice to marine mam-
mal destruction. If ever a perfect time for judicial activism was 
needed, this was the Court's opportunity.150 Congress, with its cor-
rective powers, must now put the "bite"151 back into the Packwood-
Magnuson Amendment. 
160 "[TJhe junction of the judge-a statement of social purpose and a definition of role-is 
not to resolve disputes, but to give the proper meaning to our public values." Fiss, The 
Supreme Court 1978 Terrn--Foreword: The Forms oj Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979) . 
(emphasis in original). 
Political scientist Glendon Schubert defined judicial activism stating that "the Court is 
activist when its decisions conflict with those of other political policy-makers." Schubert, 
Judicial Policy Making, in SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
VS. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 17 (D. Forte ed. 1972). 
161 See 125 Congo Rec. 21,742 (1979). Senator Packwood, during congressional debates on 
the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, stated: 
Mr. President, the policy of our Nation for many years has been to support inter-
national conservation agreements. Among the conservation efforts which the United 
States has supported is the worldwide effort to protect the great whales from ex-
tinction. The Packwood-Magnuson amendment puts real economic teeth into our 
whale conservation efforts. Id. (emphasis added). 
